USA: fisheries management - increasing catch quotas as an emergency measure... to help fishermen?

A recent press release dated 14 March 2011 by NOAA attracted my attention.

The first paragraph of the press release reads as follows:

"A new emergency increase to the butterfish fishing limit will enable squid fishermen off the northeast, who often catch butterfish unintentionally while fishing for squid, to continue working, while still protecting the butterfish stock."

Further, in another paragraph one can read:

“We’re taking swift action to raise fishing limits and to address the economic challenges faced by fishermen,” said Eric Schwaab, assistant NOAA administrator for NOAA’s Fisheries Service. “Working with the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council and the fishing industry we are taking advantage of the flexibility in the Magnuson-Stevens Act to allow more fishing while still continuing programs to rebuild fish stocks for the long-term benefits they provide.”

So, by raising the "fishing limits" for a by-catch species for squid fishermen, NOAA is helping fishermen to address the economic challenges they are facing.

This is a demonstration that fisheries management can take into account the economic challenges that fishermen have to face. In other words, when setting catch limits fisheries managers can take into account,  in addition to scientific advice, other factors such as the "economic challenges faced by fishermen".

Here is the link to the press release:

http://www.nero.noaa.gov/nero/hotnews/NR1106/

And here is a link to an article in the East Hampton Star on this subject:

http://www.easthamptonstar.com/dnn/Home/News/CommercialFishermenGetReprieve/tabid/14504/Default.aspx

WTO: fisheries subsidies and Fisheries Management Systems (in the WTO)

On 26 February 2011 I wrote a post on the reporting by the ICTSD on the February informal meeting of the Negotiating Group on Rules, where fisheries subsidies were dicussed.

The Fisheries Forum Agency (FFA) has recently published on its website the January and Feburary issues of its "FFA Fisheries Trade News".

The article on fisheries subsidies negotiations gives a very detailed account of the work accomplished by negotiators from 7 to 11 February 2011.

One interesting feature of the very detailed information provided by the authors of the article comes at the end of it. It concerns the work done by the two ‘Friends of the chair’ who had to gather WTO Members' views "on what they considered to be the core elements of a fisheries management system (FMS)"

I reproduce hereunder the table published with the article with the synthesis of the work carried by the "facilitators" on fisheries management.

As mentioned by the authors of the article Fisheries Management can become an important part of new WTO rules on fisheries susbidies as the exceptions for developing countries to subsidy prohibitions could be made dependent on fulfilling minimum requirments in the management of fish resources.

Here is the link to the article:

http://www.ffa.int/node/444

Core/Mandatory Elements	Tools (i.e. indicative, not compulsory)
1) Institutions and legislative (someone to ‘manage’ the FMS – a FM authority)
2) Stock assessment Key: data collection to allow with a degree of certainty what one’s resource-base is and what is the level of outtake (i.e. an ‘output’ element)	Trend series to assess resource base Level of sophistication depends on context
3) Fishing capacity Count boats and measure composition of fleet (e.g. size), maybe also gear (i.e. an ‘input’ element)	Vessel registry (not necessarily for smallest boats though) Licences/permits (depending upon fishery)
4) Fishing effort/capacity management Utilisation of data on stocks and fishing capacity based on: a) input controls; b) output controls	Depending on fishery: a) input controls (e.g. closed seasons, limits of gear or vessel size/numbers, etc) b) output controls (e.g. total allowable catch, vessel-specific quotas, etc)
5) MCS – based on different levels of national/ supra-national authority Key: some form of catch control is necessary to identify some form(s) of violation	Sampling, controls at port, fishing cooperative level, customary level, VMS and/or GPS onboard especially when operations in different zones, etc.
6) Enforcement	Administrative penalties Criminalisation Indigenous methods (e.g. moral pressure)

CANADA: throne speech mentions fisheries management as outdated (sic) and promises change

On 3 March 2010 er Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, Governor General of Canada, delivered the Government's Speech from the Throne.

Here is what she said on fisheries:

It (Canada's governement) will introduce new legislation to reform Canada’s outdated system of fisheries management.

Does this mean that fisheries subsidies will be prohibited in Canada? Or that Individual Fishing Quotas will be introduced with the help of subsidies, as it is the case now in the US?

Watch this spot.

Here is the link to the speech:

http://www.sft-ddt.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1388

WTO: fisheries subsidies and fisheries management

A week ago I was discussing how some NGOs and international bodies had published in their websites information about the informal meetings of the WTO Rules Negotiating Group. According to the information published by FFA the next informal meeting will take place on 29 and 30 October 2009 and will cover Article V (Fisheries Management) of the Chair's Draft negotiating text (document TN/RL/W/213 of 30.11.07)

Readers may remember that the discussions at the recent meetings, as reported by the above organisations, take place on the basis of a "Roadmap" that the Chair of the Group, Ambassador Valles (Uruguay) submitted to WTO Members in December 2008 (document TN/RL/W/236 of 19.12.08).

I copy hereunder the questions that the "Roadmap" addresses to WTO negotiators on this article. At the end of the post the reader will find the full text of Article V.

FISHERIES MANAGEMENT CONDITIONALITIES

17. The discussions in the Negotiating Group indicate that participants generally believe that exceptions – both general and S&D – should not be unconditional, given their potential to undercut the effectiveness of the disciplines on subsidies that contribute to overcapacity and overfishing.

 18. The discussions also have indicated a widely-shared view that the principal conditionalities should pertain to fisheries management, a central component of which would be stock assessments, in part because of the difficulties of directly measuring the effect of particular subsidies on particular wild capture fisheries due to the mobile and undomesticated nature of the resource.

 19. There are, however, differing views as to how much detail WTO fisheries subsidies rules should contain on fisheries management, in respect of both the substantive basis of such conditionalities and the appropriate fora and mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing their implementation. There has been considerable debate on the approach taken to these issues in my first draft text.

 

20. I would ask participants to reflect on the following questions:


(a) Are there other conditionalities that should be applicable to exceptions (general and S&D), either in addition to or instead of fisheries management conditionalities?

 (b) How important is it for the effective operation of the disciplines that all Members' fisheries management systems and measures adhere to a common standard, and how prescriptive should that standard be?

(c) If a common standard is not necessary or not acceptable, how could the effectiveness of different Members' systems in controlling overcapacity and overfishing be monitored and enforced?

• - What would prevent one Member with ineffective management from overfishing stocks that were safeguarded/replenished by another Member's effective management measures?

d) Given that an international consensus already exists in respect of a substantial number of international fisheries management instruments, and those instruments themselves take account of the capacity constraints of developing countries, does it make sense to draw inspiration from those instruments for the substantive content of management conditionalities for using exceptions from the prohibition?

• (i) If not, why not?
• (ii) If so, how could the typically non-binding nature and relatively general and flexible wording of those instruments be reconciled with a binding prohibition of subsidies that contribute to overcapacity or overfishing, and binding conditionalities concerning fisheries management where exceptions are used?

(e) What role should stock assessments play in any management conditionalities?

• (i) If stock assessments are considered unnecessary, why, and how could overfishing and overcapacity be monitored in the absence of stock assessments?
• (ii) If stock assessments are considered to be a necessary element, how could the rules take into account Members' different capabilities while ensuring that the assessments are as reliable and robust as possible?
• (iii) To what extent if at all should the results of stock assessments form part of any conditionalities?

(f) Is it logical to require a stock assessment before a capacity-enhancing subsidy is provided?

• (i) If not, why not?
• (ii) If so, what practical problems would need to be resolved?
• (iii) What timing and review mechanism for such stock assessments could best reconcile a Member's need to implement a given subsidy on the one hand, and other Members' need for multilateral surveillance/transparency in respect of the fisheries resources that would be affected by it on the other hand?

(g) Given the existing role of the FAO in discussing FAO members' substantive implementation of various international fisheries instruments, what specific problems/concerns would there be if that role were enhanced in respect of stock assessments and/or fisheries management systems?

• - Would the problems be the same if the review at the FAO were similar to reviews of notifications by WTO bodies (i.e., multilateral review among members, for transparency, rather than a mechanism for approval, whether by a panel of experts or a multilateral body)?

(h) Why, if at all, would the WTO be better-positioned to perform such reviews of fisheries-related information?

• - How could the necessary expertise be built into any WTO-based review of fisheries management, without the WTO becoming a fisheries management organization?

Article V Fisheries Management

Any Member granting or maintaining any subsidy as referred to in Article II or Article III.2(b) shall operate a fisheries management system regulating marine wild capture fishing within its jurisdiction, designed to prevent overfishing. Such management system shall be based on internationally-recognized best practices for fisheries management and conservation as reflected in the relevant provisions of international instruments aimed at ensuring the sustainable use and conservation of marine species, such as, inter alia, the Fish Stocks Agreement, the Code of Conduct, the Compliance Agreement, technical guidelines and plans of action (including criteria and precautionary reference points) for the implementation of these instruments, or other related or successor instruments. The system shall include regular science-based stock assessment, as well as capacity and effort management measures, including harvesting licences or fees; vessel registries; establishment and allocation of fishing rights, or allocation of exclusive quotas to vessels, individuals and/or groups, and related enforcement mechanisms; species-specific quotas, seasons and other stock management measures; vessel monitoring which could include electronic tracking and on-board observers; systems for reporting in a timely and reliable manner to the competent national authorities and relevant international organizations data on effort, catch and discards in sufficient detail to allow sound analysis; and research and other measures related to conservation and stock maintenance and replenishment. To this end, the Member shall adopt and implement pertinent domestic legislation and administrative or judicial enforcement mechanisms. It is desirable that such fisheries management systems be based on limited access privileges . Information as to the nature and operation of these systems, including the results of the stock assessments performed, shall be notified to the relevant body of the FAO, where it shall be subject to peer review prior to the granting of the subsidy . References for such legislation and mechanism, including for any modifications thereto, shall be notified to the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures ("the Committee") pursuant to the provisions of Article VI.4.

V.2 Each Member shall maintain an enquiry point to answer all reasonable enquiries from other Members and from interested parties in other Members concerning its fisheries management system, including measures in place to address fishing capacity and fishing effort, and the biological status of the fisheries in question. Each Member shall notify to the Committee contact information for this enquiry point.

NORWAY: fisheries subsidies in political parties' manifestos. Part I the Centre Party

On 14 September 2009 general elections took place in Norway. It is likely that the left wing coalition in power before the elections will stay and govern for the next four years.

I write "likely" on intent because one of the parties, the Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti or SV), has pledged to voters that it would oppose the opening of the fishing grounds around the Lofoten and the Vesterålen islands for the exploitation of oil. At the time of writing this post negotiations among the concerned parties (Ap, SV and Sp) for the continuation of the coalition are still ongoing.

Fisheries, even though of very modest importance when compared to other economic sectors (e.g. energy) is still an importance constituency for most political parties in this country.

I went through the election programmes of some of the main parties looking for their pledges in fisheries and aquaculture. I must confess that it was a fishing (for subsidies!) expedition. Here is the catch for the Senterpartiet (Sp). This party, with farmers as its main constituency, participated in the previous government. These are some of the proposals

• With the help of increased "economic means" stimulate the growth in harvests and catches of populations of seals and whales so that stocks of edible fish can grow and pay due consideration to Norwegian hunting traditions and hunting environment.
  

As my translation might not reflect all the nuances of the Norwegian origional I copy here the Norwegian text:

"Gjennom økte økonomiske virkemidler stimulere til økt høsting og fangst på bestandene av sel og hval, for igjen å kunne øke bestandene av matfisk og ta vare på norske fangsttradisjoner og fangstmiljø."

• Uphold the "Råfiskloven" (whereby fishermen's sales organisations act as monopolies for the first sale of some fish species, see my post of 26 June 2009 "NORWAY: sales monopolies - supporting fishermen without subsidies?") and the "Deltakerloven" "Particpants law"),
  
  Ensure a decentralised landing structure through the allocation of budgetary resources to the "Transport Regulation" and to landing sites where there is no other alternative to land [or deliver].

On aquaculture the Senterpartiet is proposing to:

• Establish a compensation mechanism for the cleaning and restoration of sites where serious (fish)illness has occurred. The cost of the compensation would have to be shared among, stakeholders, the state and insurance companies.

And concerning the strengthening of the competitiveness of the fishing industry:

• Abolish the yearly fee for the fishing vessels' register and the yearly fee to be paid by aquaculture companies to local authorities.
  
  Oppose the introduction of a "control fee" for the fishery and aquaculture sectors.

The above proposals are noteworthy.

First of all the one related to encouraging, with the help of economic resources, the "harvest" of seals and whales. With the EU banning almost all trade in seal products it seems only logical that subsidies will be the only way to keep this "harvest" alive.

Furthermore, the Senterpartiet wants to maintain the monopoly of the sales organisations and the barriers to the entry in the profession as set-out in the "Participants' law (Deltakerloven). This is perfectly in line with the tradition of a party which has farmers as its main constituency.

The proposal to subsidise the construction of landing sites and the transport of fish is not a surprising one. Indeed, the previous government had launched a vast subsidy programme for fishing infrastructure (see my post of 21 March 2009 "NORWAY: hundreds of millions of krona for fisheries specific infrastructure").

Such policy explains Norway's defence at the WTO of subsidies to fisheries infrastructure. In Norway's written submission to the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations (TN/RL/GEN/144 of 26/01/2007) we can read "OECD figures on transfers demonstrate that, on average, around 70 per cent of the transfers are used to finance either biological research and fisheries management systems or are measures financing infrastructure, such as harbours and fishing community installations. These are all measures that the majority of WTO Members agree should fall outside the scope of the new discipline."

So, it seems that according to Norway, subsidies to fishing infrastructure do not have negative impacts on fisheries resources.

Finally, it is more than clear that the Senterpartiet would have serious problems with the introduction of "cost-recovery" fisheries in the fisheries and aquaculture sector. The proposals to abolish fees and to oppose the introduction of a "control fee" are a clear illustration of this. This is in stark contrast with the positions of some key members of the WTO "Friends of Fish" group that consider that the non-recovery of fisheries management costs (including control) is a substantial subsidy.

Here are links with the proposals (in Norwegian) of the Senterpartiet for the fisheries sector:

http://produksjon.senterpartiet.no/article.php?articleID=34280

http://www.fiskebat.no/files/documents/spfiskeri.doc

NEW ZEALAND: documentary on NZ fishing practices

A documentary titled “The Great New Zealand Fishing Scandal” is making a lot of noise in that great fishing nation.

The main theme of the documentary, made by the investigative journalist Guy Henderson, are the fishing practices by foreign vessels that are allowed to harvest fish in NZ waters on behalf of domestic companies.

According to the New Zealand press the documentary shows foreign factory vessels (with foreign crews) chartered by New Zealand companies to catch fish under the quota (e.g. of orange roughy) of the latter.

Some of the comments made in the aforementioned press echo a certain degree of discontent, as such practices can result in New Zealanders being deprived of jobs in the fishing industry. Furthermore the documentary seems to point to an alleged lack of control on the operations of these foreign vessels.

New Zealand’s Maritime Union has asked for a Parliamentary investigation on this matter.

At any rate, New Zealand is a strong competitor in international trade in fisheries products. The New Zealand government has always contended that it does not provide subsidies to its fishing industry. It is thus to the credit of private operators that they try to do their utmost to lower their cost to remain competitive in the international markets, including by hiring foreign vessels that are less expensive to operate than domestic vessels.

I tried to find an official reaction to the documentary but without success. I would very much welcome if readers can provide me with information on a reaction from New Zealand’s authorities, or from NZ companies, to the documentary.

By the way, this documentary reminds me of a number of articles, back in 2006, about criticism by Maoris on proposal by the government to regulate the salaries paid in these foreign chartered vessels.

Here a few links on the contents of the documentary.

http://www.munz.org.nz/index.php/2009/08/05/inquiry-into-fishing-industry-needed/

http://www.documentarychannel.co.nz/synopsis?show=fd818130-8b17-4065-9f0e-42154b6248d3

http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0907/S00133.htm

http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PO0908/S00055.htm

http://newzealandconservative.blogspot.com/2009/08/new-zealands-third-world-fisheries.html

An interview (in MP3 format) with the maker of the documentary can be found here.

http://www.wammo.co.nz/2009/08/03/the-great-nz-fishing-scandal/

Information on NZ’s legislation concerning treatment of foreign chartered vessel crews can be found here:

http://www.immigration.govt.nz/community/stream/employ/employingtemporaryworkers/whatisrequired/nonzworkers/specialfields/foreignfishingcrews.htm

Here is a link to an article published in the “Australia and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal” Vol 23, No 1 (2009) titled “Modern Day Slavery: Employment Conditions For Foreign Fishing Crews In New Zealand Waters” written by Jennifer Ann Devlin.

https://maritimejournal.murdoch.edu.au/index.php/maritimejournal/article/view/82

And here is a link on Maori’s criticism to setting foreign crew wages at the same level as NZ‘s ones

http://www.newstalkzb.co.nz/newsdetail1.asp?storyID=104952

CANADA: Canadian study refers to fisheries subsidies in Canadian fisheries policies

This week a study evaluating fisheries management practices worldwide was published in PlosBiology.

The study has been carried out by and written by Camilo Mora, a Columbian researcher at Dalhousie University.

The focus of the study is how governments, by means of fisheries management regimes, translate scientific recommendations into policy in an inclusive and transparent way. On the basis of the results the study ranks countries. According to the study "Canada's ability to create transparent policy for fisheries was ranked 20 out of 54 possible ranks. In terms of scientific robustness, Canada ranked 15 out of 63 possible ranks".

Concerning Canada, Mr Mora said in an interview to the Westerly News:

"In the scientific side it lacks a broader ecosystem-based management of fisheries, scientific recommendations are not fully incorporated into policies and it has a high fishing effort with some subsidies," Mora added. "Those conditions prevented a better global ranking for it."

Here are links to the study and to the press article from the Westerly:

http://www.plosbiology.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.1000131

http://www2.canada.com/westerly/news/story.html?id=cff7ef32-6a1f-4d70-b35f-33751b777528